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ACIS - 1006/85
9 January 1985MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence ✓

FROM:

[REDACTED]
Deputy Chief, Arms Control Intelligence StaffSUBJECT: Your Copy of the Letter From the Senate Budget Committee
to the President on Arms Control Treaty Violations [REDACTED]

1. You will recall that after having received your copy of the attached letter from Senators Helms, Symms and East, you asked whether or not there was anything particularly new in it and if so, what did we see as its significance. In general, there is very little, if anything, that is new here. Regardless, the significance of the package lies in the timing of its exposition and delivery. It suggests that at least one wing of the anti-arms control lobby is deeply concerned about the Shultz-Gromyko talks and the prospects for renewed arms control negotiation. This is their way of letting the President and the rest of the Executive Branch know that they intend keeping the compliance fires burning. By the way, the fact of this letter, and elements of it, appeared in the Evans and Novak column in today's (9 January) Washington Post. [REDACTED]

3. These are all familiar allegations. Some of them are legitimate and are being addressed by the Executive Branch now for the President's Report to Congress, due 1 February. (All told, about a dozen of those compliance issues cited in the letter are being treated in the President's Report.) [REDACTED]

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

7 January 1985


MEMORANDUM FOR:
Arms Control Intelligence Staff

FROM: DCI

SUBJECT: Arms Control Treaty Violations -
Letter dated 4 January 1985 to
the President from Senate Budget
Committee

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Is there anything particularly new on this
and what do you see is its significance?


William J. Casey

Attachment:
Above referred to letter

DCI
EXEC
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
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Remarks

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Executive Secretary

Date

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Executive Registry

85-034

STEPHEN BELL, STAFF DIRECTOR
 ELIZABETH TANKERSLEY, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

January 4, 1985

The President
 The White House
 Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As the new Congress convenes, we commend you for the two reports which you sent to the Senate last year detailing Soviet arms control treaty violations. The first of these, of course, was your report of January 23, 1984; the second was the report of the Presidential General Advisory Commission (the so-called GAC Report) which you transmitted on October 10, 1984. Between the two of these reports, you sent notice to Congress of 21 specific Soviet violations confirmed by the Administration.

Important as these two reports were, we nevertheless believe that there are at least 43 further Soviet SALT violations widely reported in the press which have yet to be confirmed by the Administration. These are detailed in an appendix to this letter. Since this would make a total of 64 Soviet violations, we believe that a review of all of the 43 violations ought to be included in your report to Congress which has been announced as forthcoming on February 1 if the meaning and spirit of current law is to be fulfilled.

Indeed, the necessity for a complete and authoritative review of all Soviet arms control violations was clearly underlined by the excellent letter of National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, dated November 30, 1984, on the status of further reporting on the Soviet SALT violations. It is gratifying that Mr. McFarlane quoted you as saying that we must take Soviet violations "very seriously" because they "call into question important security benefits from arms control and could create new security risks."

Although some have tried to minimize the importance of the GAC Report, Mr. McFarlane evidently does not. It is clear from his letter that the Administration considers both reports of equal authority. Indeed, Mr. McFarlane notes that both of these presidential reports "concluded that the Soviet Union has, in fact, violated a number of important arms control commitments."



The President
January 4, 1985
Page Two

In this, he echoes your own statement during your June 14, 1984 press conference that the GAC Report was "a report on out-right violations...Yes, there have been those violations."

Of course, you yourself had commissioned the GAC Report on November 19, 1982. Moreover, the Report itself stated that "many of the compliance issues considered in the report have been reviewed by the U.S. Government." Indeed, the seven items in your January report are also mentioned in the GAC review. When the overlap in coverage of the two reports is taken into consideration, most analysts count at least 21 separate violations.

Mr. President, as you yourself have stated, "compliance with arms control agreements is fundamental to the arms control process." We therefore urge you to have Secretary of State George Shultz press upon Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Geneva the absolute necessity of ending Soviet SALT violations as a precondition to serious negotiation.

Mr. President, such a course of action would be in accord with the expressed desires of the American people. For many years, public opinion polls have shown that the overwhelming majority of our citizens are convinced already that the Soviets have been violating the arms control treaties. (Copies of these polls are annexed to this letter.)

Moreover, such a course of action would be fully in accord with the promises of the Republican Party. The 1980 Republican Party Platform stated: "We pledge to end the Carter cover-up of Soviet violations of SALT I and II."

The 1984 Republican Party Platform stated:

Carter-Mondale efforts to cover-up Soviet violations of the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitations Agreement and Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty emboldened the Soviets to strengthen their military posture. We condemn these violations . . .

Moreover, there is now important new evidence that this cover-up has interfered with the pursuit of fruitful and equal arms control negotiations. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the chief architect of detente and SALT in the 1970's, has recently written the following:

There is no doubt that the Soviets have often barely observed the letter of agreements; in some cases, they clearly seem to have violated them. (The Washington Post, December 16, 1984)

The President
January 4, 1985
Page Three

Previously, Dr. Kissinger had conceded that Soviet deployment of heavy SS-19 ICBMs to replace light SS-11s was "sharp practice" in SALT I, and that Soviet testing of surface-to-air missiles and radars in an ABM mode was an "actual violation" of the SALT I ABM Treaty. But now Dr. Kissinger has added a highly significant admission:

Successive administrations have been reluctant to make a formal charge of violation lest they undermine the domestic support for negotiation and because they did not know what to do about it.

But now, Mr. President, the cover-up is ending because of your forthright approach to the review of these violations. The attitude that a cover-up is necessary, as advocated by some professionals with vested interests in the arms control community, is totally wrong. On the contrary, we believe that straightforward discussion of these matters with the Soviets as part of the negotiating process will immeasurably strengthen the public's confidence in the arms control negotiations and is essential to securing public support and the Senate's support for any completed treaty.

That is why we urge you to include in your February 1 report a complete analysis and conclusions with regard to each of the 43 specific and long-standing compliance issues which we have annexed to this letter. We feel that the omission of even one of these issues would not be in accord with the McClure-Helms-Symms amendment which passed the Senate unanimously on September 22, 1983 on a 93-0 roll call vote. Moreover, Section 37 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (the Derwinski Amendment) requires reports not only on the detection and verification of violations, but also on the verifiability of U.S. and Soviet arms control proposals.

Mr. President, we believe that a forthright approach to Soviet SALT violations with Mr. Gromyko, and a full assessment of the additional 43 Soviet violations in your February 1 report to Congress will immeasurably strengthen U.S. national security and lead to confidence in real reductions of nuclear arms in the world.

Sincerely,

Steve Symms
John P. East

Jesse Helms

The President
January 4, 1985
Page Four

Attached: 1. Annex with Unclassified List of 43 Unreported
and Unconfirmed Soviet Arms Control Treaty Violations
2. Poll reports
3. January 26 and 27, 1984 Senate letters to the
President, unanswered
4. ACDA Act, Section 37
5. Letter to ACDA, July 8, 1982, unanswered

cc: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, CIA
Director, ACDA
National Security Advisor to the President

Annex: Unclassified List of 43 Unreported and Unconfirmed Soviet Arms Control Treaty Violations, in Order of Military Significance

The U.S. Unilateral Disarmament under SALT II

1. Soviet failure to deactivate over 500 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, in order to come down to the SALT II level of 2,250. The Carter Administration claimed this deactivation to be the principal U.S. military benefit from SALT II. This is the most obvious and the most militarily significant Soviet SALT II violation, yet it has never been reported to Congress in two successive Presidential violations reports. Even the London Economist has pointed this out as a clear-cut Soviet SALT II violation. The only way to explain this glaring omission is to postulate that your Administration has reached some secret agreement with the Soviets exempting them from this deactivation. If this is the case, the Senate should have been informed. Such an agreement would be contrary to the Constitution, Section 33 of the Arms Control Act, the Case Act, and the Jackson Amendment requirement for equal levels of forces. At the very least, this Soviet violation negates your Administration's "interim restraint" policy of "not undercutting" and in fact complying precisely with the unratified SALT II Treaty as long as the Soviets show "equal restraint." This Soviet failure to deactivate shows no restraint at all, because while the U.S. has unilaterally deactivated 292 strategic delivery vehicles, counted in SALT II, carrying over 500 warheads, the Soviets have in fact been adding Backfire and Bear H bombers with long range ALCMs, SS-16 mobile ICBMs, and now mobile SS-24 and SS-25 ICBMs, Typhoons, SS-N-18s, SS-N-23s, and even supersonic and other cruise missiles to their forces. Thus the U.S. is engaged in unilateral disarmament in the face of Soviet SALT II break-out.

George Will in The Washington Post of December 30, 1984 precisely described the State Department's appeasement of the Soviets while the U.S. unilaterally complies with SALT II. Will wrote:

Although the SALT II agreement, signed in 1979, will never be ratified, both sides have agreed not to 'undercut' it, including its provision limiting both sides to 2,250 long-range bombers and missiles. The Soviets have never adhered to that limit and in recent weeks have passed 2,500. But a U.S. official eager for continued U.S. unilateral compliance with SALT II, has come forth to say: 'We are not sure that the "no-undercut" provision (sic) is violated if the Soviets do not keep the 2,250 limit on missiles and bombers. It means not complying, but does it mean undercutting?' The Soviet Union has a lot of people whose job is to violate agreements, and a lot of people whose job is to try to hide violations, and a third lot whose job is to try to explain away violations that are detected. Do we really need to employ, in the State Department, a lot of people to help with the rationalization by distinguishing the act of 'undercutting' agreements from the act of 'not complying with' agreements?

On June 24, 1982, a top State Department official was asked what the difference was between the Soviets abiding by SALT II or adhering

to it. He answered: "...if one were to adhere to the treaty we would be requiring the Soviets to now have reduced and continuing to reduce, and we're not requiring that. So we're not requiring that they adhere to the treaty...They say they are not bound to it." The Soviets are not adhering to or abiding by SALT II, hence they are undercutting it.

The Kennedy-Khrushchev Violations

2. Soviet violations of the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement by deployment of offensive nuclear delivery capable weapons in Cuba with twice the capability of the missiles and bombers there in 1962. This Soviet violation done in the early 1970s was partially reported in the GAC Report, but there is further evidence in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Moreover, this Soviet arms control violation is so important that it should be explicitly and fully treated. Finally, you yourself have publicly accused the Soviets of violating the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement twice, and you have been backed up by the UnderSecretary of Defense, the CIA Director, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Even the State Department concedes that on several occasions, the Soviets have violated the "spirit" of the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement. If the Soviets are violating the agreement that ended the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, does this mean the U.S. is back into a nuclear crisis with the Soviets?

The Soviet Violation of All SALT II Ceilings

3. Soviet announced intention to violate the 820, 1200, and 1320 SALT II ceilings on MIRVs and long-range ALCMs, and Soviet programmatic preparations to do so before SALT II expires at the end of 1985. These preparations include impending deployment of the MIRVed SS-24 and SS-25 ICBMs in both silo and mobile modes, continued production of Delta III and Typhoon submarines, and production of Backfire and TU-95 Bear H intercontinental bombers with long-range ALCMs. And all Bears should count in the 1320 ceiling, because they can carry the long-range AS-3 Kangaroo. Meanwhile, the U.S. plans to scrap 4 perfectly operational Poseidon submarines in order to comply unilaterally with the SALT II 1200 MIRV ceiling. Again, this is U.S. unilateral disarmament.

Thus the Soviets are violating all the MIRV/ALCM ceilings, in addition to violating the ceiling of 2,250 on total strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. The Soviets are also violating the Article IV SALT II constraint on developing no more than one new type ICBM, the key constraint of SALT II. In sum, the Soviets have succeeded in converting the SALT II Treaty into a hollow shell, with virtually no constraints on them, while the U.S. has committed itself to precise unilateral compliance with an unratified treaty. The Soviets have added over 200 intercontinental bomber and 200 ICBMs to their forces since 1979, when SALT II was signed, according to official Defense Department data.

Soviet Transcendence of MX

4. Deploying 14 warheads on each SS-18, when SALT II allows only 10. This has allowed the Soviets to add over 2,200 warheads alone to their ICBM force during the year of 1984 alone, which is over 3 times the number of warheads the MX will add to the U.S. ICBM force between 1987 and 1990, if MX is ever deployed. This has resulted in a Soviet ICBM force carrying over 8,500 warheads, a 4 to 1 numerical advantage over the U.S., and a 6 to 1 advantage considering Soviet accuracy and megatonnage advantages. Meanwhile, the U.S. has

reduced the MX payload from 14 warheads to 10, and has reduced MX throw-weight, in order to comply with SALT II. And the U.S. is gratuitously and unilaterally deactivating 54 Titan II ICBMs, one-third of our ICBM megatonnage. Moreover, the MX program has been cut in half since the Carter Administration.

5. Soviet developing, testing, and exercising the SS-18 ICBM rapid reload and refire capability, to include stockpiling extra missiles and ground support equipment near launch sites, in violation of SALT II's prohibition on ICBM rapid reload capability. Indeed, the Soviets have even given their hot-launched SS-11 and SS-19 ICBMs a refire capability, in addition to their cold-launched SS-17.

Soviet ABM Break-Out

6. Soviet developing, testing and deploying an ABM rapid reload and refire capability, prohibited by the SALT I ABM Treaty.

7. Soviet preparations for deployment of a nationwide ABM defense, involving ABM Battle Management Radars, plus ABM-mode mobile SAM interceptors and ABM-3 mobile radars, in violation of the SALT I ABM Treaty.

8. Soviet preparations for a second ABM complex defending ICBMs with SAM-5, SAM-10, and SAM-12 ABM interceptors, in the Krasnoyarsk region, in violation of the SALT I ABM Treaty. The Soviets are already circumventing the SALT I ABM Treaty by giving the modernized Moscow ABM system the capability to defend ICBMs.

9. Soviet testing of surface-to-air missiles in a prohibited ABM mode--SAM-5, SAM-10, and SAM-12. Former Defense Secretary Laird charges this is a violation of the SALT I ABM Treaty, and former Secretary of State Kissinger has also conceded that this was a "violation." This should be explicitly reported on, because it was regarded only as a "possible" violation in the GAC Report. But a Soviet defense expert has even admitted that the Soviets have tested SAMs in a prohibited ABM-mode.

Soviets Increase the Risk of Nuclear War

10. Soviet violation of the 1971 Agreement to Prevent the Risk of Nuclear War, by jamming U.S. early warning detection systems and failing to notify the U.S. of this jamming. As the 1984 edition of Soviet Military Power states on page 35: "The Soviets also have the technological capability to conduct electronic warfare against space systems." They are doing this. These are acts of electronic warfare in space, and at the very least should inhibit progress in further arms control negotiations until the jamming stops.

Soviets Deploy Heavy SS-19 ICBM

11. Soviet circumvention of the object and purpose of the SALT I Interim Agreement by their deployment of their heavy SS-19 ICBM, to replace their light SS-11 ICBMs. This helped to give the Soviets a 6 to 1 counterforce first strike superiority. Although this violation was confirmed already in the GAC Report, it is of

paramount military significance because it sextupled the warheads in the 360 converted single-warhead SS-11 silos. It therefore should be explicitly treated by the Administration. Former Defense Secretary Melvin Laird first charged Soviet SS-19 deployment as a SALT I violation in 1975. Henry Kissinger called it "sharp practice" in 1979.

12. Concealment of the existence and heavy throw-weight of the SS-19 heavy ICBM, during SALT I negotiations, and repeated denial of their intention to deploy such a missile to replace their light SS-11 ICBM. This is a related issue of Soviet negotiating deception on the most important issue of SALT I; heavy ICBM constraints. Again, Kissinger called the SS-19 deception "sharp practice."

Soviet Backfire Bomber Violations

13. As UnderSecretary of Defense DeLauer has testified, production of 35 Backfire bombers per year for several years, in violation of Brezhnev's SALT II commitment not to produce more than 30 per year. The late Soviet Premier Kosygin on August 20, 1979, told U.S. Senators that this would be a violation, and that the U.S. could abrogate SALT II if the Soviets did this.

14. Arctic staging of the Backfire bomber, in violation of Brezhnev's pledge that as an integral part of SALT II, the Soviets would not give the Backfire an intercontinental radius capability.

15. Giving Backfire a refueling capability, in violation of Brezhnev's SALT II pledge not to give Backfire a refueling capability. All of these Backfire constraints were an integral part of SALT II, according to the Carter Administration.

16. Equipping Backfire with long-range ALCMs, causing it to count in the SALT II 1320 MIRV/ALCM ceiling and putting the USSR over this ceiling.

17. Deceiving the U.S. on the Backfire's inherent range of 8,900 to 11,000 kilometers, which is much more than the 8,000 kilometer range of the obsolete Bison bomber which did count in SALT II.

Soviet Heavy SLBMs

18. Testing and preparation to deploy the SS-NX-23, a heavy SLBM, in violation of SALT II's prohibition on heavy SLBMs. Even the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that this is a Soviet SALT II violation.

Soviet Stockpiled ICBMs

19. Producing and deploying old stockpiled SS-11 ICBMs at MRBM and IRBM soft sites for covert soft launch, in circumvention of SALT I and SALT II ceilings. This was one of the GAC Report's "suspicious events," and it is an important Soviet violation.

20. Maintaining several thousand Soviet stockpiled ICBMs, SLBMs, and SLCMs, and thus circumventing all SALT II ceilings. The Soviets have made preparations not only to rapidly reload ICBM silos, but also to rapidly reload SLBM and SLCM submarines after firing their missiles at sea.

Soviet Submarine Violations

21. Constructing "Stretch Y-Class" submarines with illegal missile bay sections, which are even longer than the original ballistic missile bay sections, and which have illegal missile tubes penetrating the pressure hull for a prohibited type of long-range supersonic SLCM launchers. This is a very dangerous Soviet violation of the SALT I Interim Agreement and the 1974 agreed SALT dismantling procedures, because it could greatly increase the surprise attack threat to U.S. bomber forces.

22. Construction of over 68 strategic submarines, when the SALT I Interim Agreement allowed only 62. Moreover, maintaining over 981 SLBMs, when SALT I allowed only 950.

Soviet Reuse of Deactivated ICBM Complexes

23. Bringing back ICBMs to deactivated ICBM complexes, such as the reported deployment of the mobile SS-25 ICBM at the Yurya complex where SS-20s are now also deployed.

Soviets Have 7 MX-Equivalent ICBMs

24. Soviet development of two more new type ICBMs, the SS-X-26, and SS-X-27, when only one new type ICBM is allowed by SALT II, and the Soviets are already deploying two other new type ICBMs, the SS-24 and SS-25.

Soviets Develop Powerful New Warheads

25. Additional and recent Soviet violations of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty yield limit of 150 kilotons, such as one on October 27, 1984, and one on December 16, 1984. Another Soviet underground test registering 7.2 on the Richter scale was reported in late December. While the January 23, 1984 Presidential Report listed Soviet violations of the TTBT as "likely," these more recent violations provide more evidence allowing a stronger judgment.

Soviets Renege on Pledge

26. Violating Brezhnev's SALT I pledge not to build mobile ICBMs, by building and deploying mobile SS-16 ICBMs during the time the SALT I Interim Agreement was in effect. Even President Carter conceded in 1977 that the Soviets had deployed mobile ICBMs.

Soviets Have Capability for Nuclear Weapons in Space

27. Keeping 18 SS-9 Fractional Orbital Bombardment ICBMs operational at a test range, in circumvention of the SALT I Interim Agreement constraint on ICBM launchers and prohibition of operational launchers at test ranges. Even the Carter Administration conceded this SALT I violation in its analysis of the SALT II Treaty. This deployment also circumvents the 1967 U.S.-Soviet Treaty banning nuclear weapons in outer space.

Soviets Admit One Violation

28. Failure to deactivate old ICBMs on time under the SALT I Interim Agreement, and the 1974 agreed SALT dismantling procedures, and continuous falsification of official deactivation reports. The Soviets actually admitted in March, 1976 that they had failed to deactivate the required number of ICBMs, and that therefore they were in violation. They remained in violation through 1982.

Soviet SALT Deceptions Violate Good Faith Requirement of Negotiations

29. Soviet withholding from their SALT II Data Exchange Reports of the fact that their AS-3 Air-to-Surface Missile deployable on over 100 Bear bombers has a range of 650 kilometers and therefore should be counted in the SALT II MIRV/ALCM ceiling. This violation was first revealed by the first edition of Soviet Military Power in 1981.

30. Soviet misrepresentation of Backfire range and refueling capabilities in SALT II negotiations. Even SALT-seller Strobe Talbott concedes this Soviet deception.

31. Soviet concealment of the full range of the SS-N-8 SLBM during SALT I negotiations.

32. Soviet falsification of their troop data in the Mutual Balanced Force Reductions negotiations.

33. Soviet withholding notification of their deployed SS-16 mobile ICBMs from their SALT II Data Exchange Reports.

34. Increasing Soviet use of large-scale and deliberate strategic camouflage, concealment, and deception, including telemetry encryption and jamming of U.S. telemetry collection capabilities. These activities violate both SALT I and SALT II, and have been increasing since SALT negotiations began in 1969. They are confirmed as deliberate by a Soviet military dictionary.

35. Creation of a new Soviet ABM test range in 1975 without the required prior notification, in violation of the ABM Treaty.

36. Soviet falsification of their deactivation of excess ABM test range launchers in 1974.

Soviets Violate First Strategic Arms Agreement

37. Repeated Soviet violations of the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty since 1965, continuing through the present. The 1984 venting level was as high as the 1965 venting itself. This violation was partially reported in the GAC Report, but more evidence has since become available.

38. Soviet flight-testing of their SS-24 and SS-25 at night, with the mobile launchers continuously concealed by camouflage, thereby violating the SALT II provision that the U.S. must be able to determine the relationship between a new missile and its launcher.

39. Soviet deployment of the SS-20, having ICBM range capability, as a circumvention of both the SALT I and SALT II ceilings on ICBM launchers. In addition, the Soviets falsified their Data Exchange by not including all their SS-20s.

40. Soviet deployment of "IIIX silos" with a deceptive configuration similar to a missile launch silo, confusing the U.S. as to the number of Soviet ICBM silos between 1970 and 1973.

41. Soviet achievement of "unilateral advantages" through their circumvention and violations of SALT I and II. These unilateral advantages violate the 1972 Agreement on Basic Principles of U.S.-Soviet Relations, which is mentioned in the Preamble to the SALT II Treaty as a fundamental element of SALT II.

42. Soviet violation of the June 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, through their actions in the October 1973 Middle East War.

43. Use of submarine berthing tunnels to hide Soviet SLBM submarines, in violation of the provisions of both SALT I and SALT II banning deliberate camouflage, concealment, and deception which impedes verification.

As the late Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev duplicitously prophesied, in regard to the first strategic arms limitation treaty, the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty: "If some side violates the assumed commitments, the initiators of this violation will cover themselves with shame, they will be branded by all the people of the world."

Mr. President, as you yourself stated so eloquently before the United Nations General Assembly on June 17, 1982:

Simply collecting agreements will not bring peace.
Agreements genuinely reinforce peace only when
they are kept. Otherwise we are building a paper
castle that will be blown away by the winds of war.

As former Arms Control Director Rostow testified to Congress in July, 1981:

No arms control agreement can contribute to the goal of a peaceful world unless we have confidence that the Soviet Union is abiding by its terms.

In 1935, prior to World War II, Sir Winston Churchill challenged the British Government over whether or not Hitler's Nazi Germany was complying with the arms control provisions of the Versailles Treaty. In the House of Commons, Churchill emphasized that: "The worst crime is not to tell the truth to the public..."

ILLEGIB

JUL 27 1984

Poll: Women are bigger Cold War hawks

WASHINGTON (UPI) — A nationwide poll commissioned by a conservative think tank shows that Americans largely have a tough view of the Soviet Union and women take a harder line than men on key security issues.

The poll, released today by The Heritage Foundation, shows that of those questioned, 97 percent believe the Soviets are violating arms control and other interna-

tional agreements.

The survey also showed that 73 percent of the women questioned, compared to 46 percent of the men, said the main reason for the deterioration of superpower relations was Soviet hostility toward democracy and the Western world.

The Heritage Foundation, a conservative research institute in Washington, D.C., commis-

sioned Sindlinger & Co. of Media, Pa., to conduct the study of 2,258 people nationally between June 26 and July 9.

The poll asked questions about U.S. security issues and superpower relations. While there is a "gender gap" on these issues, the Foundation said, "The nature of the gap contradicts conventional wisdom. Rather than being softer or more dovish than men, women

seem tougher and take a harder line on key issues."

Among its findings:

—85 percent of all those polled believe the United States should not sign any arms accord with the Soviets until the United States is certain it can monitor and verify compliance.

—85 percent favored Reagan's "Star Wars" space defense program.

WASHINGTON — A nationwide poll commissioned by a conservative think tank shows that Americans largely have a tough view of the Soviet Union, and women take a harder line than men on key security issues. The poll, released today by The Heritage Foundation, shows that of those questioned, 97 percent believe the Soviets are violating arms control and other international agreements.

JUL 27 1984

DUBUQUE, IOWA
TELEGRAPH HERALD
D. 37510 S. 44/742

AN UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL WIRE STORY



Insiders Report

Tracking the Policy Process in Washington

New Poll on National Security Issues: During the two week period from June 26 to July 9 the Sindlinger national polling organization conducted a nationwide poll commissioned by the Heritage Foundation of 2,258 persons on U.S.-Soviet relations and other security issues. The results show that the public believes by a huge margin that the Soviets cannot be trusted. Also, a significant majority supports a policy of countering the Soviet threat, including deployment of the anti-ballistic missile defense known as "Star Wars."

The gist of some of the questions and the results:

• Do you believe that the USSR is violating its arms control agreements?

Yes	96.8%
No	.5%
Don't know	2.7%

• Should the U.S. enter into an arms control treaty with the USSR that does not absolutely assure that the U.S. can verify that the USSR is observing that treaty?

Yes	4.8%
No	95.0%
Don't know	.2%

• Should the U.S. offer concessions to lure the Soviets back to negotiations or remain firm and only offer concessions if Moscow does?

U.S. Should offer concessions	35.1%
Offer concessions only if the Soviets do	62.8%
Don't know	2.1%

• Would you favor developing a system which would protect much, if not all, of the population from nuclear destruction, by a ballistic missile defense?

Yes	82.6%
No	15.2%
Don't know	2.2%

• Should the U.S. encourage or support dissidents and

ethnic minorities in Eastern Europe and the USSR with the objective of political liberalization in these countries?

Yes	72.0%
No	19.9%
Don't know	8.1%

• Would you say that the situation in Central America is a threat to the security of the U.S.?

Yes	66.5%
No	32.6%
Don't know	.9%

State Department Bonuses: A list of 85 recipients of executive bonuses for senior career foreign service officers has been released by the State Department. It includes five bonuses of \$20,000 each, 39 at \$10,000 and 26 at lesser amounts. The recipients are selected by boards of fellow foreign service officers, who may be friends or even subordinates of the candidates. In the rest of the government, decisions on executive bonuses are made by management, i.e., by the President's appointees. But the foreign service has agreed with its labor unions to preclude management from participating in the decision making process, to prevent the "politicization" of the foreign service. Some contend that the real effect is to prevent the Administration from exercising its management responsibilities.

The 1984 awards include \$20,000 for Charles Bray, who was President Carter's deputy director of the U.S. Information Agency for four years, and \$10,000 each for Thomas Enders, relieved earlier this year as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, and Michael Armacost, recently named Under Secretary for Political Affairs over conservative objections. Most surprising was a \$20,000 top bonus for Ronald Spiers, who as Under Secretary for Management is in overall charge of the bonus program. Pity the poor board members—it is tough to vote against a bonus for the boss.

Soviet Information Control (Cont. from p. 3)

What are the results of these massive investments in thought control? How much of the propaganda is sloughed off as tendentious nonsense, and how much sticks? The short answer is that much of the Party line, especially on foreign affairs, gains at least partial acceptance. Michigan State University sociologist Boris Shlapentokh draws a distinction between propaganda about everyday life in the USSR, on which the Party line gains little acceptance because people can see where it is false, and conditions in the outside world, where they cannot.

Russians see things differently in matters relating to the outside world than non-Russians, who comprise nearly half the Soviet population. Roughly grouped in 15 national republics, all Soviet citizens are subject to the same propaganda from Moscow, but not all are equally susceptible. The Baltic republics and others on the western border, such as Ukraine, retain a different awareness of the West and its values than Russians. Although overrun by Nazi Germany, many were more impressed by Germany's—and Europe's—post-war recovery than by German wartime excesses.

The forty million Central Asian Turks have their own religious and historical framework from which they view the world, only partially modified by the imposition of Russian imperial power. Urbanization, industrialization, and literacy may not have created a sense of gratitude toward the Russians who brought these forces to Central Asia, but the changes did have the effect of making the Turks susceptible to the impact of modern mass media.

Russian propaganda and agitation, coupled with Party organization, have been regarded by Moscow as the most important of domestic activities. Internally, no other aspect of rule enjoys as much intense and continuous attention by the Politburo. Konstantin Chernenko, who spent his entire professional life involved in these activities, is not likely to diminish their importance. His firm commitment to and effective use of the instruments of propaganda to assure Party control are essential to his political survival. Any meaningful moderation of total state control of information in Soviet society should not be expected.

Paul A. Smith, Jr. is the Editor of Problems of Communism. The views contained herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of USIA or the U.S. Government.

January 26, 1984

Honorable Ronald Reagan
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We greatly appreciate your excellent recent President's Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements. We believe that the report has serious implications for national security, and we intend to cooperate with you fully in dealing with the increased threat to United States national security which Soviet SALT violations represent.

Your report states that there is "an expanding pattern of Soviet violations or possible violations of arms control agreements." It also states that "additional issues of concern are under active study." State Department policy guidance for public diplomacy has stated that "The Soviets are violating or probably violating certain provisions of other major agreements. There have been additional Soviet activities over the past year which have added to our concern."

We strongly agree with you. The legislative history in the Senate of the amendment requesting your report on Soviet SALT violations specified that all Soviet violations of both the letter and the spirit of all arms control treaties to which the Soviet Union is party should be provided in an unclassified report.

In particular, therefore, we request a further public report on some serious new Soviet violations of the SALT II Treaty reported recently in the press:

- Production of more than 30 Backfire bombers per year;
- Arctic staging of Backfire bombers;
- The Intercontinental range of 8,900 kilometers and refueling capability of the Backfire bomber;
- Continued production of TU-95H Bear bombers to be equipped with long range cruise missiles;
- Development of a new heavy Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile, the SS-NX-23;

Page 2

-- Early deployment of 100 SS-X-24 Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles carrying Multiple-Independently-Targetable Re-entry Vehicles, in single warhead SS-11 ICBM silos;

-- Soviet admission in November 1983 at the SALT Standing Consultative Commission of the fact that their forces exceed all three SALT II ceilings on MIRVs and bombers equipped with long range cruise missiles, 820, 1200, and 1320;

-- The Soviet refusal to dismantle over 250 strategic delivery vehicles by the end of 1981 in order to comply with the SALT II ceiling of 2250 strategic delivery vehicles; and continued expansion of their forces since 1981;

-- The seriously increased and widespread pattern of Soviet camouflage, concealment, and deception.

Several additional well known Soviet violations of SALT II need to be reported upon:

-- SS-18 rapid reload/refire capability as a violation of the SALT II prohibition on rapid reload and refire capabilities;

-- Deployment of AS-3 Kangaroo Air to Surface missiles with range of "650 Kilometers" (see Soviet Military Power) on 100 TU-95 Bear bombers, in further violation of the SALT II Data Exchange and the 1320 ceiling;

-- Deployment of new long range air-launched cruise missiles on Bear and Backfire bombers, in further violation of the 1320 ceiling.

In addition, there have been some recent press reports of Soviet violations of the SALT II ABM Treaty which also need to be reported on:

-- Soviet testing of Surface-to-air missiles in a prohibited ABM mode, such as SAM-5s, SAM-10s, and SAM-12s;

-- Deployment of five other prohibited Battle-Management radars, in addition to the Abalakovo radar;

-- Development and mass production of a prohibited mobile, rapidly deployable ABM, the ABM-3 and its SH-04 and SH-08 interceptor missiles and mobile radars;

-- Testing of a prohibited ABM rapid reload and refire capability;

- Deployment of a prohibited nation-wide ABM defense;
- Deployment of more than 100 ABM launchers around Moscow.

Mr. President, we strongly support your efforts to preserve the integrity of the arms control process by challenging Soviet SALT violations. We all are trying to safeguard world peace.

As you yourself said at the United Nations General Assembly on June 17, 1982:

"Simply collecting agreements will not bring peace. Agreements genuinely reinforce peace only when they are kept. Otherwise we are building a paper castle that will be blown away by the winds of war."

And as former Reagan Administration Arms Control Director Eugene Rostow testified to Congress in July 1981: "No arms control agreement can contribute to the goal of a peaceful world unless we have confidence that the Soviet Union is abiding by its terms."

We thank you in advance for your prompt responsiveness to this request.

With warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

James A. McClure
James Helms
Larry Pressler
Roger Jensen
Steve Symms
Jeremiah Denton
Orin Hatch
Bob Kasten

CC: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Director, ACDA
Director, CIA
Chairman, JCS

WASHINGTON, DC 20500

January 27, 1984

The Honorable Ronald Reagan
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We strongly congratulate you on your statesmanlike leadership in publishing The President's Report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements. This was an excellent report. We look forward to working with you to strengthen United States national security in the face of the Soviet SALT violations.

Yet we respectfully suggest there is more to be done. We need not remind you that the July 1980 Republican Party Platform explicitly states:

"The Republican Party deplores the attempts of the Carter Administration to cover-up Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements ... We pledge to end the Carter cover-up of Soviet violations of SALT I and II."
(Emphasis added.)

It has been widely discussed in the intelligence community that there were over 32 outstanding cases of Soviet SALT and other arms control violations which occurred under the Carter-Mondale Administration prior to July 1980, and which were covered up or explained away by the Carter-Mondale Administration. Intelligence information on some of these SALT violations was actually suppressed by the Carter-Mondale Administration, which issued a White Paper in February 1978 giving the Soviets a clean bill of health on SALT I compliance. Many of the multiple Soviet SALT I violations have been confirmed by former Secretary of State Kissinger and former Defense Secretary Laird.

We have carefully studied the seven violations in your recent report. We believe that it is reasonable to conclude that all seven Soviet SALT and arms control treaty violations cited in your report were either detected after the July 1980 Platform Statement or became conclusive after that time.

Your report states that there is "an expanding pattern of Soviet violations or possible violations of arms control agreements." It also states that "Additional issues of concern are under active study." State Department policy guidance for public

diplomacy has stated that "The Soviets are violating or probably violating certain provisions of other major agreements. There have been additional Soviet activities over the past year which have added to our concern."

We strongly agree. The legislative history in the Senate of the amendment requesting your report on Soviet SALT violations specified that all Soviet violations of both the letter and the spirit of all arms control treaties to which the Soviets are party should be provided.

Accordingly, we respectfully request an additional Presidential report on all Soviet SALT I and II and other arms control treaty violations which occurred prior to July 1980. Some of these pre-1980 SALT I violations, such as Soviet deployment of the SS-19 ICBM and Soviet construction of ABM Battle-Management radars and ABM mode SAM tests, appear to be even more conclusive and serious than the seven cases in your report. Moreover, many of them have been confirmed by Dr. Kissinger and Secretary Laird. We therefore request that you update the Carter-Mondale White Paper of 1978.

We also request that you send to us a copy of the report of your Arms Control General Advisory Committee analyzing seventeen Soviet arms control violations since 1958.

Attached is an unclassified partial list of these Soviet SALT and other arms control treaty violations which were covered-up by the Carter-Mondale Administration.

Mr. President, we strongly support efforts to preserve the integrity of the arms control process by challenging Soviet SALT violations. We all are trying to safeguard world peace.

As you yourself said at the United Nations General Assembly on June 17, 1982:

"Simply collecting agreements will not bring peace. Agreements genuinely reinforce peace only when they are kept. Otherwise we are building a paper castle that will be blown away by the winds of war."

And as former Reagan Administration Arms Control Director Eugene
Boslow testified to Congress in July 1981: "No arms control
agreement can contribute to the goal of a peaceful world unless
we have confidence that the Soviet Union is abiding by its terms"

With warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

James Helms
Jeremiah Denton

James A. McClure

Lucy Plessler

Orin Hatch

Roger W. Jensen

Ed Pastor

Law Symms

CC: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Director, ACDA
Director, CIA
Chairman, JCS

Attachment

Soviet SALT I and II Violations Covered-up by Carter-Mondale

Reclassification

A. SALT I Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

1. Soviet SAM testing in an ABM mode. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has conceded this is a Soviet SALT "violation" on September 12, 1982.
2. Soviet deployment of ABM Battle Management Radars.
3. Soviet ABM camouflage.
4. Soviet falsification of ABM deactivation.
5. Soviet creation of a new ABM Test Range without the required prior notification.
6. Soviet deployment of a rapidly deployable, mobile ABM.

B. SALT I Interim Agreement on Offensive weapons

1. Soviet deployment of the heavy SS-19 ICBM as the replacement for the light SS-11 ICBM, which is the most dangerous of all Soviet SALT violations. On August 12, 1979, Dr. Henry Kissinger conceded that this deployment constituted "sharp practice" by the Soviets. In 1974, former Defense Secretary Melvin Laird termed SS-19 deployment a clearcut "violation".
2. Soviet failure to deactivate old ICBMs on time, and falsification of official reports.
3. Bringing back ICBM equipment to a deactivated ICBM complex.
4. Keeping 18 SS-9 ICBMs illegally operational at a test range, which was conceded in the explanation of the SALT II Treaty.
5. Soviet deployment of "III X" silos with a configuration similar to a missile launch silo.
6. Soviet massive use of deliberate camouflage, concealment, and deception which actually increased after 1972, and which constituted deliberate interference with United States National Technical Means of verification:

-- encryption of missile telemetry,

-- camouflage of ICBM testing, production, deployment,

-- concealment of SLBM submarine construction, berthing, construction of dummy submarines and their concealment, construction of berthing tunnels,

7. Constructing over 68 strategic submarines, when only 62 were allowed.
8. SS-20 mobile missile deployment, which should count as mobile ICBM deployment.
9. Violation of Brezhnev's pledge not to build mobile ICBMs.
10. Deploying SS-11 ICBMs at SS-4 MRBM sites, probably having a covert soft launch capability.
11. Keeping about 1,300 to several thousand old ICBMs stockpiled for both covert soft launch and rapid reload of silos for refire.

C. SALT II Treaty

1. Soviet encryption of telemetry on SS-NX-20 "Typhoon" SLBM.
2. Soviet encryption of telemetry on SS-18 Mod X ICBM.
3. Soviet encryption of telemetry on SS-NX-19 SLCM.
4. Soviet encryption of telemetry on SS-20 IRBM.
5. Soviet camouflage of new submarines.
6. Soviet SS-20 deployment.
7. Soviet continued stockpiling of SS-16 mobile ICBMs.
8. Soviet AS-3 Kangaroo Air-to-Surface missiles with range of 650 kilometers on the TU-95 Bear bomber.
9. Soviet AS-6 Air to Surface missile with range of 1,000 kilometers on Backfire bombers.
10. Reported Soviet rapid reload and refire exercises for the SS-18 cold-launched ICBM.

D. Other Arms Control Treaty Violations Covered-up by Carter Administration

1. Over 30 unambiguous Soviet ventings of radioactive debris from underground nuclear tests in violation of the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty. These ventings are all unequivocal, and resulted in the spread of radio-active debris outside of Soviet borders.

2. Over eight Soviet underground nuclear weapons tests, probably over 150 kilotons, in violation of the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty.
3. Over six Soviet violations of the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement of 1962.
 - a) Soviet Combat Brigade in Cuba.
 - b) Golf and Echo Class submarines at Cienfuegos.
 - c) Cienfuegos strategic submarine base with nuclear warhead storage facility.
 - d) Nuclear delivery capable aircraft. 40 MIG-23 or 27 Floggers. 12 TU-95 Bear bombers with operable bomb-bays.
 - e) Use of Cuba as a revolutionary base.
 - f) Probable Biological and Chemical Warfare Facilities.

As of January 1, 1981.

Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended**CONTENTS**

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of any Government agency (including the Agency and the Director).

VERIFICATION OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

SEC. 37.³⁴ (a) It is the sense of the Congress that adequate verification of compliance should be an indispensable part of any international arms control agreement. In recognition of such policy and in order to assure that arms control proposals made or accepted by the United States can be adequately verified, the Director shall report to the Congress, on a timely basis, or upon a request by an appropriate committee of the Congress—

(1) in the case of each element of any significant arms control proposal made to a foreign country by the United States, or made to the United States by a foreign country, the determination of the Director as to the degree to which such element can be verified by existing national technical means;

(2) in the case of any arms control agreement or treaty that has entered into force, any significant degradation or alteration in the capacity of the United States to verify the various components of such agreement or treaty;

(3) the number of professional personnel assigned to arms control verification on a full-time basis by each Government agency; and

(4) the amount and percentage of research funds expended by the Agency for the purpose of analyzing issues relating to arms control verification.

(b) For purposes of paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a), the Director shall assume that all measures of concealment not expressly prohibited could be employed and that standard practices could be altered so as to impede verification.

(c) Except as otherwise provided by law, nothing in this section shall be construed as requiring the disclosure of sensitive information relating to intelligence sources or methods or persons employed in the verification of compliance with arms control agreements.

TITLE IV—GENERAL PROVISIONS

GENERAL AUTHORITY

SEC. 41.³⁵ In the performance of his functions, the Director is authorized to—

(a) utilize or employ the services, personnel, equipment, or facilities of any other Government agency, with the consent of the agency concerned, to perform such functions on behalf of the Agency as may appear desirable. It is the intent of this section that the Director rely upon the Department of State for general administrative services in the United States and abroad to the extent agreed upon between the Secretary of State and the Director. Any Government agency is authorized, notwithstanding any other provision of law, to transfer to or to receive from the Director, without reimbursement, supplies and equipment other than administrative

³⁴ 22 U.S.C. 2577. This section was added by Sec. 4 of Public Law 95-108.

³⁵ 22 U.S.C. 2581.

United States Senate

July 8, 1982

Dr. Eugene Rostow
Director, United States Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency
Washington, D.C.

Dear Dr. Rostow:

The issue of verifiability is at the heart of the arms control process. There is a widespread sentiment in Congress that no significant progress in arms control can be made unless the people of the United States are assured of the verifiability of any agreement, or proposed agreement.

We are therefore concerned that ACDA has not taken the initiative to assure Congress and the American people that it is addressing the issue of verifiability in a forthright manner. We note that ACDA was very slow in recreating the Verification Bureau, and that even now, a year after you took office, the Bureau has not been fully staffed. In addition, there are key issues on verifiability which, to our knowledge, ACDA has neither examined nor reported on to Congress despite the intense public interest in their resolution. These issues include:

- the verifiability of the unratified but not withdrawn Threshold Test Ban Treaty;
- the verifiability of the various nuclear weapons freeze proposals;
- the verifiability of the President's START proposal;
- the presence of any significant degradations in the capacity of the United States to verify:
 - a) the SALT II Treaty
 - b) the Threshold Test Ban Treaty
 - c) the Limited Test Ban Treaty
 - d) the SALT I ABM Treaty
 - e) the SALT I Interim Agreement.

We note that Section 37 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, the "Derwinski Amendment," provides ACDA with the authority to initiate such reports to Congress. To date, ACDA has not taken this initiative. In addition, Section 37 also allows the Congress to request the Director of ACDA to make such reports.

Accordingly, we would ask that you report as soon as possible to the Senate Intelligence, Foreign Relations, and Armed Services Committees and to the full Congress on an unclassified basis about the verifiability of the above arms control treaties and proposals

and also, on any degradation of U.S. verification capability. In addition, we request that you assess the effects of Soviet concealment measures and altered practices upon the verifiability of the above treaties and proposals. We further request that these reports should be received by the Congress before any new arms control treaties or proposals are voted on.

As you know, serious charges have been leveled in the press concerning recent Soviet violations of several arms control treaties or agreements. Given the urgency of the forthcoming floor debate on SALT II and other arms control proposals, it is crucial that the validity of these charges be aired and brought to the attention of the American public. Specifically, we request that you answer the following questions:

- 1.) Has classified U.S. intelligence data ever been revealed to the Soviets during the SALT process? If so, can it be made public? Has the SALT process jeopardized any U.S. intelligence sources and methods?
- 2.) Has the U.S. ever provided the Soviets photography of deactivated U.S. ABM sites and deactivated U.S. ICBM sites? Have the Soviets ever reciprocated with photography of any of their own installations?
- 3.) Has the U.S. ever provided the Soviets with classified U.S. data on new U.S. Early Warning radars, such as "Pave Paws"? Have the Soviets ever provided the U.S. with similar data?
- 4.) Have the Soviets ever charged the United States with deliberate concealment, which in effect is a violation of SALT I and SALT II?
- 5.) Given the well-known fact that the Soviets have expanded their strategic concealment, camouflage, and deception activities since 1972, despite the SALT I and II bans on deliberate concealment; and given U.S. recognition that the well-known Soviet camouflage net at a missile test range is acknowledged to have constituted deliberate concealment, has the U.S. ever charged the Soviets with deliberate concealment? Is it possible that the Soviets have charged the U.S. with deliberate concealment, while the U.S. has not similarly charged the Soviets?
- 6.) Since SALT began in 1969, has intelligence data related to SALT ever been embargoed from and within the intelligence community, either temporarily or permanently? Has any such data also been withheld from Congress? Is there an Executive Order which provides that CIA shall receive all intelligence data collected within the U.S. government?

- 7.) If the U.S. tried to ban a missile the size of the Soviet SS-19 in 1972 under SALT I, in an attempt to limit Soviet counterforce capabilities, does the SS-19's deployment allowed under SALT I and II result in a reduction in U.S. national security? Does the Administration nevertheless believe that the Soviet SALT I compliance record does not reduce U.S. national security?
- 8.) Have the Soviets ever falsified a report of the number of ABM or ICBM launchers they have deactivated? Were all of those launchers required to be deactivated ever properly deactivated?
- 9.) Have the Soviets ever claimed that "trust" was involved in SALT compliance?
- 10.) What was the time span between first U.S. detection of each possible Soviet SALT violation, and its final resolution in the SCC? Did the U.S. ever acquiesce in the Soviet position?
- 11.) Is there any classified evidence of Soviet negotiating deception in SALT? Was a classified study on Soviet SALT deception ever withheld or suppressed within the Executive Branch, or withheld from Congress?
- 12.) If Defense Department and military posture statements have recognized that during the 1969-1979 SALT decade the strategic balance has shifted against the U.S. and in Soviet favor, how has this shift in the balance affected U.S. leverage in enforcing Soviet compliance with SALT I?
- 13.) Has there been any evidence in the past year suggesting Soviet violations of the SALT I ABM Treaty, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the SALT I Interim Agreement, the BW Convention, the SALT II Treaty, and the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement of 1962?
- 14.) Has there been any diplomatic challenge in the past year to Soviet violations of these agreements?
- 15.) Precisely how many Soviet SS-7 and SS-8 ICBMs were fully dismantled according to the SCC procedures each month between October 1975 and the present? How many SS-7 SS-8 ICBMs were required to be in fully deactivated status each month between October 1975 and the present? Were Soviet reports on their deactivation ever at variance with U.S. intelligence data? Was former Secretary of State Vance's public statement that the Soviets were in full compliance on deactivations in June 1976 correct?
- 16.) Were there any Soviet tests of surface to air missiles or radars in an ABM mode since 1975?

Dr. Eugene M. Wigner page 4

- 17.) Were any Soviet SAM missiles ever tested against Soviet tactical or strategic ballistic missiles?
- 18.) How many Soviet nuclear weapons tests since 1963 have vented either solid or gaseous debris? How many U.S. diplomatic complaints have been made? What was their result?
- 19.) List all Soviet nuclear weapons tests and their yields since March 1976 which had a central value over 150 kilotons. Explain how our yield calculation methodology has changed since 1974. Explain the confidence levels in central values well above 150 kilotons.
- 20.) Have the Soviets introduced ICBM equipment into a deactivated old ICBM complex, in possible violation of the SALT I Interim Agreement? Have the Soviets introduced ICBM equipment at a medium range ballistic missile complex, also in possible violation of the SALT I Interim Agreement? Have the Soviets introduced mobile ICBM equipment into a deactivated old ICBM complex?
- 21.) Are the reports of Soviet construction of large phased array battle management radars correct? Has this issue been raised with the Soviets?

We would appreciate receiving complete answers to these questions as soon as reasonably possible.

Sincerely yours,

Gene Helms *Roger W. Jensen*

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

January 3, 1985

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As the new Congress convenes, I strongly commend you for your forthrightness last year in reporting twice to Congress and the American people on Soviet arms control treaty violations.

The Washington Post reported today that the U.S. will confront the Soviets with their treaty violations next Monday in Geneva. In particular, the Post stated that Secretary of State Shultz would charge the Soviets with constructing a new large radar in violation of the SALT I Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and encrypting the electronic telemetry from missile tests in violation of the SALT II Treaty. These are illustrative and conclusive cases from a list of 21 Presidentially confirmed violations.


I agree with your statement that "compliance with arms control agreements is fundamental to the arms control process."

I therefore hope that the reports are true, and that you will instruct Secretary Shultz to give the Soviet Foreign Minister a chance to demonstrate Soviet good faith by deeds -- stopping at least these two conclusive violations. I believe that the Soviets should be given this opportunity to demonstrate their sincerity, good faith, and reciprocal interest in equitable arms control. I hope that they respond favorably.

I believe that frank and open discussion of these issues with the Soviets will immeasurably strengthen the public's confidence in the security benefits of arms control treaties by restoring full Soviet compliance.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,



James A. McClure
United States Senator

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

STEPHEN BELL, STAFF DIRECTOR
 ELIZABETH TANKERSLEY, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

January 4, 1985

The President
 The White House
 Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Your Presidential Report to Congress on Soviet SALT violations of October 10, 1984, stated: "The U.S. has never had a long-range, comprehensive strategy to deter and if necessary initiate measures to offset Soviet arms control non-compliance." We are urgently concerned that since your January 23 and October 10, 1984 Reports to Congress confirming 21 Soviet arms control treaty violations, no action has been taken.

In his famous 1961 Foreign Affairs article entitled "After Detection, What?", Dr. Fred Ikle stated that the U.S. reaction to detected and then verified Soviet arms control violations must be U.S. counter-vailing defense programs. Inevitably, these could require either increases in the defense budget, or alternatively, reprioritizing of allowed defense resources toward strategic programs. On October 20, 1980, former Defense Secretary Harold Brown stated: "To match the bigger Soviet force without SALT could cost us, over the next decade, an additional 30 to 100 billion dollars." Soviet SALT I and II break-out has brought on this situation. At the very least, further defense budget cuts must be prevented. As Defense Secretary Weinberger stated in a letter to us on April 5, 1984:

The magnitude of the risks for the U.S., the potential consequences of Soviet violations, and the absolutely essential need to take actions that have a realistic chance of deterring future cheating compel me to take full account of Soviet actions, potential capabilities, and possible intentions in the development of defense requirements and to urge full funding for the U.S. defense modernization program.

Assistant Defense Secretary Richard Perle testified to Congress on February 22, 1984: "We must, if we are not to face an expanding pattern of Soviet violations, see that such violations carry costs at least equal to the gains they derive from them." Defense Secretary Weinberger added on April 5, 1984: "...Since the Soviets have suffered practically no penalty for violating their current arms control commitments, they are unlikely to be deterred from

The President
January 4, 1985
Page Two

more serious violations in the future." You yourself stated on January 16, 1984: "We must take the Soviet compliance record into account, both in the development of our defense program and in our approach to arms control." And as the 1984 Republican Party platform stated: "To deter Soviet violations of arms control agreements, the United States must...display a willingness to respond to Soviet violations which have military significance." Finally, the Scowcroft Commission on Strategic Forces stated that the essence of deterrence of nuclear war is U.S. political will. If the U.S. fails to have the political will to take action against Soviet SALT violations, deterrence will be gravely weakened.

On March 1, 1984, we wrote to Defense Secretary Weinberger asking for a detailed study of the military implications of the Soviet SALT violations. (letter enclosed) He answered on April 5, 1984 that "a study of the military implications of Soviet arms control violations is underway..." Almost a year has gone by since then, and we still have not seen the study. Accordingly, we respectfully again request as part of your FY1986 Budget Request that you provide a detailed analysis of the military and budgetary implications of each of the 21 Soviet arms control violations confirmed in your two 1984 Reports to Congress. In addition, we respectfully request that as soon as the analysis of the 43 violations which should be covered in your forthcoming February, 1985 report is completed, that you also immediately provide a detailed analysis of their military and budgetary implications. It would greatly assist our efforts in support of your defense programs if these reports were made available in both unclassified and classified forms.

We intend to request from the respective Chairmen a series of early hearings on the Military Implications of the Soviet SALT violations in the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, Armed Services Committee, Foreign Relations Committee, and Budget Committee, and your reports will be the first order of business. We are hoping to be able to formulate and pass a Soviet SALT Violations Emergency Response Act which might at least earmark some contingency stand-by funds to deal with this serious problem.

We agree with your January, 1984 Presidential Report to Congress on Soviet SALT violations, which stated: "Soviet violations deprive us of the security benefits of arms control directly because of the military consequences of known violations, and indirectly by inducing suspicion about the existence of undetected violations that might have additional military consequences."

As Dr. Henry Kissinger warned Senators and Congressmen on June 15, 1972:

The possibility always exists that the Soviets
will treat the Moscow (1972 SALT I) Agreements

The President
January 4, 1985
Page Three

as they have sometimes treated earlier ones, as just another tactical opportunity in the protracted conflict. If this happens, the United States will have to respond...If this agreement were being circumvented, obviously we would have to take compensatory steps in the strategic field."

During the decade since SALT I, the Soviets have circumvented and violated both SALT I and SALT II, as Henry Kissinger recently acknowledged, just as they violated all security treaties between 1917 and 1962. But the U.S. has yet to take compensatory counter-measures, as Dr. Kissinger foresaw would be necessary.

Dr. William Van Cleave testified to the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee on March 28, 1984, that "Non-reaction to Soviet arms control violations will take on the character of appeasement. As Soviet military power increases, so will the disincentives to challenge Soviet violations of international law. The Romans had a phrase for this: Silent leges inter arma. Or, the laws are silent in the presence of arms. They also had a phrase for those who followed the course of appeasement: Vae victis; or woe to the vanquished."

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

Steve Symms

Jesse Helms

John P. East

Enclosure: Letter to Defense Secretary, March 1, 1984

cc: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, CIA
Director, ACDA
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
National Security Advisor to the President

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 1, 1984

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The Honorable Caspar Weinberger
 Secretary of Defense
 Department of Defense
 The Pentagon
 Washington, D.C. 20330

Dear Cap:

We are concerned about the military implications of the Soviet SALT violations mentioned in the President's Report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements. Neither SALT I nor SALT II seem to be constraining the Soviet offensive and defensive threat. We seem to be witnessing apparent Soviet "break-out" from both the offensive and defensive constraints of SALT I and II. Since 1979, the Soviets have increased the number of nuclear warheads targeted on the United States by about 75 percent, according to Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle.

As President Reagan stated in his speech of January 16, 1984:

"We must take the Soviet compliance record into account, both in the development of our defense program and in our approach to arms control."

And as President Reagan stated in his Report to Congress on Soviet SALT violations:

"Soviet violations of arms control agreements could create new security risks. Such violations deprive us of the security benefits of arms control directly because of the military consequences of known violations, and indirectly by inducing suspicion about the existence of undetected violations that might have additional military consequences."

We strongly agree with the President's statements. Accordingly, we urgently request that you prepare for us as soon as possible a precise study of the military implications of all nine of the Soviet SALT and other arms control violations in the President's report. We also urgently request a similar report on the military implications of all 40 of the old and the new Soviet SALT and other arms control violations not included in the President's report, including Soviet activities in Cuba violating

the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement. These reports are a vital necessity for our deliberations on the FY 1985 Defense Authorization and Appropriations Bills.


The U.S. may need to consider accelerating the initial operational schedule for a space-based, layered Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense, and certain offensive "quick fix" options such as deployment of stockpiled Minuteman III ICBMs.

With warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,




Jake Garn
United States Senator




Orrin Hatch
United States Senator



Robert Kasten
United States Senator



James A. McClure
United States Senator



Jesse Helms
United States Senator



Steve Symms
United States Senator

CC: Chairman, JCS
Director, CIA
National Security Advisor
to the President
Director, ACDA
Secretary of State